Institutional investors' 13F stockholdings reveal stark differences between the investment philosophy and skill of hedge funds and mutual funds. Hedge funds tend to buy stocks with low past returns, while mutual funds tend to be trend followers. The nearly two-thirds of hedge funds that follow contrarian strategies outperform their risk-and characteristic-adjusted benchmarks by 2.4% per year. Hedge funds that follow momentum strategies do not outperform their benchmarks, irrespective of whether these benchmarks control for momentum. By contrast, most mutual funds follow momentum strategies; their managers exploit the momentum anomaly but lack trading skill once we control for the effect of momentum on stock returns. The most profitable trades of contrarian hedge funds are purchases of stocks sold by momentum mutual funds. The superior performance of contrarian hedge funds is persistent and arises from strategies that are more complex than purchasing stocks with low past returns.
skills-the ability to pick the right losers among stocks with similar characteristics.
Consistent with prior studies, we find that about 2/3 of mutual fund managers follow momentum strategies, both for purchases and sales. The investment style of these funds is persistent: Conditional on their survival, 76% of mutual funds that follow momentum strategies in the first half of the sample period also follow the same strategies in the second half. In contrast to hedge funds, momentum mutual funds outperform contrarian mutual funds. However, once we control for the return enhancing effects of momentum, differences in performance between the two styles of mutual fund management disappear.
The style measure we use, first proposed by Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) [GTW], is based on the vector product of the fund's portfolio weight changes with past stock returns. When stocks with relatively high past returns witness portfolio weight increases and those with relatively low past returns generate portfolio weight decreases, this product is positive-indicating a momentum strategy. Our measure of fund performance is the analogous product, but with future returns replacing past returns. Performance thus measures the ability of the fund's portfolio weight changes to predict future returns, following Grinblatt and Titman (1993) [GT] . An equivalent perspective is that the GT measure evaluates active management by comparing fund returns to a benchmark return that would be earned if the fund maintained its prior stockholdings.
We further adjust the GT performance measure for the impact of stock characteristics. In particular, the performance measure uses returns that are size-and book-to-market-adjusted as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) [DGTW] . Where appropriate, we also adjust for momentum with the same DGTW procedure. The adjusted performance measure tests for true stock-picking skills by adding an extra measure of assurance that a managed portfolio is not beating its benchmark (the passive portfolio it replaced) in a given month because it deviates from that portfolio in its size, book-to-market, and momentum attributes.
Our holdings-based evaluation of fund investment style and performance has several advantages over comparable analyses of reported fund returns. First, holdings-based hedge fund evaluation avoids well-known biases in hedge fund return databases-including survivorship, backfill, and self-selection biases (see Hsieh, 1997, 2002b) , and possible misreporting (see Patton, Ramadorai, and Streatfield, 2015) . These biases arise because reporting to a hedge fund return database is voluntary and hedge funds can choose to report (or stop reporting) following strong (poor) performance, or revise their reports in a self-serving manner.
Our sample does not suffer from these biases because we estimate fund performance using quarterly holdings reported in mandatory 13F SEC filings and stock returns from CRSP.
Second, the granularity of fund holdings allow us to distinguish active investment decisions (changes in quantities held) from passive momentum investing (due to changes in prices) when evaluating a fund's strategy and performance. Third, we can compute holdings-based measures of style and performance without the contaminating effects of incentive fees and high-water marks, which can introduce non-linearity and path dependence in hedge funds' returns (see Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov, 2004) . Finally, the fund's prior quarter holdings offers a benchmark for style and performance evaluation. Choosing the right benchmark is especially important for hedge funds, which hold stocks with different characteristics than other institutional investors (Griffin and Xu, 2009 ) and follow strategies with option-like payoffs (e.g. Fung and Hsieh, 1997 , 2002a . While we are not the first to use fund holdings data, even for hedge funds, 6 our analysis uses a much larger cross-section and longer time-series to provide novel findings on hedge funds' investment style and performance.
The GT performance measures reveal that mutual funds do not beat benchmarks that 6 Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) analyze the 13F holdings of 53 hedge funds during the 1998-2000 technology bubble. Griffin and Xu (2009) find that their sample of 306 hedge funds outperforms mutual funds at stock picking, but exhibits no ability to time sectors or pick better stock styles. Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012) study drivers of the drastic decrease in hedge fund holdings in 2008. Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Yang (2013) study the "confidential holdings" of hedge funds (permitted for certain informationsensitive holdings and reported with delay) and show that these have superior performance. Finally, Reca, Sias, and Turtle (2014) find that the trades of 350 large hedge funds do not destabilize prices by crowding out equity trades, but rather drive prices toward fundamental values. adjust for momentum, whereas hedge funds overall outperform their benchmarks irrespective of whether they contain a momentum control. The superior performance of hedge funds is persistent and entirely attributable to the subset of hedge funds that follow contrarian strategies. Contrarian hedge funds beat their passive benchmark by 2.4% per year based on size, book-to market, and momentum-adjusted returns, with two-thirds of this average fund performance coming from the purchases of stocks. Indeed, the stocks that are net purchases of contrarian hedge funds have an average DGTW-adjusted alpha of 2.2% per year and outperform the stocks sold by these funds (excluding short sales) by an average alpha of 3.2% per year.
7 In sum, contrarian hedge funds exhibit superior stock-picking ability that goes beyond a naïve style-based strategy.
Previous papers on hedge fund performance mostly rely on self-reported fund returns and find mixed results. One camp finds that hedge funds with greater managerial incentives earn superior returns (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik 2009) and that the performance of top hedge fund managers persists and cannot be explained by luck (Kosowski, Naik, and Teo 2007; Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov 2010) . The other camp documents that less that 20% of long/short equity hedge funds consistently deliver alpha (Fung and Hsieh 2001) and hedge funds on average outperform mutual funds, but not the market, while being more volatile than both mutual funds and the market. Furthermore, questions remain about the reliability of self-reported returns: Patton, Ramadorai, and Streatfield (2015) provide recent evidence that returns in hedge fund databases are frequently revised; the revisions are predictable and tend to increase average monthly returns by 0.62% per month.
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We find that hedge funds' success as contrarian investors comes at the expense of mutual funds: the highest alpha to contrarian hedge fund buys comes from stocks that mutual 7 Contrarian hedge funds may also short-sell borrowed shares. Although data limitations prevent observation of funds' short sales, these limitations do not affect our conclusions if fund strategies in borrowed shares are similar to those applied to existing portfolio holdings.
8 Although Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Yang (2013) observe that SEC filings may also be revised, the revisions-being infrequent and motivated by private information-cannot be viewed as attempts to manipulate performance. funds sell. Mutual funds are subject to a number of regulations that constrain their trading behavior, offering profitable trading opportunities for their less constrained counterparts.
For example, U.S. mutual funds are required to provide daily liquidity to their shareholders, which may lead to "fire sales" driven by unusually large investor redemptions. Chen, Hanson, Hong, and Stein (2008) show that hedge fund returns are higher in months when the mutual fund sector is in distress and conclude that hedge funds may engage in front-running to exploit the predictable trades of mutual funds. We also find that hedge funds' contrarian trading (buying of losers) increased during 2008-2009, while mutual funds' selling of losers intensified. In addition, mutual funds cater to retail investors' demand for 'fashionable' stocks, which may provide trading opportunities for contrarian hedge funds (Massa, Simonov, and Yan 2012) .
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The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it offers novel evidence that hedge funds tend to be contrarian, using a large cross-section of institutional holdings, and second, that contrarian hedge funds are the only class of funds exhibiting stock-picking skills. The latter finding helps investors identify which fund managers have talent. It also supports the predictions of theoretical models of investor behavior. For example, in the rational expectations model of Watanabe (2008) , investors with more precise private signals are contrarians, relying more on their private signals to detect when stock price movements overshoot fair value, while less informed agents become trend followers, relying more on the public signal of price movements to form trades. In Makarov and Plantin (2015) , unskilled managers use strategies (like momentum) that generate 'fake' alpha to temporarily manipulate investors' perception of their skills. Third, we identify performance persistence among hedge funds. Finally, our holdings data empirically confirm previous predictions that hedge funds profitably exploit the poor trades of mutual funds.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 1 and 2 describe the data and 9 Massa, Simonov, and Yan (2012) find international evidence that hedge funds perform better where mutual funds ownership is higher and argue that hedge funds take advantage of mutual funds' constraints. methodology. Section 3 discusses the results and some robustness tests. Section 4 concludes.
Data
Institutional stock ownership is computed from the mandatory quarterly 13F filings of investment advisors.
10 We obtain the holdings data from Thomson Reuters. We classify each 13F filing as belonging to a mutual fund advisor, hedge fund advisor, or other advisor. Mutual fund advisors are identified from the Thomson Reuters mutual fund database, which provides their corresponding number on the 13F tape. The remaining 13F filers are manually identified as hedge fund or non-hedge fund managers by matching their names with a comprehensive list of hedge fund manager names obtained from various sources.
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In addition, we cross-check the registration documents (Form ADV) of all firms registered under the Investment Advisers Act. 12 A firm is classified as a hedge fund advisor only if the form indicates that more than 50% of its regulatory assets under management belong to pooled investment vehicles other than investment companies (a category that contains hedge funds and other private funds).
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Over our 1998-2012 sample period, we identify 589 unique mutual fund advisors, 1,343 hedge fund advisors, and the remaining 2,894 advisors as "others." 14 Plot A of Figure 1 presents the number of mutual and hedge fund advisors in each quarter. The number of 10 Since 1980, all institutional investment advisors managing $100 million or more must report their stockholdings on Form 13F to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Reporting is required for all long stock positions of 10,000 or more shares and positions valued at $200,000 or more.
11 Sources include Lipper TASS, Hedge Fund Research (HFR), Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets (CISDM), Morningstar, Bloomberg, and Businessweek Private Company List.
12 Prior to 2011, many hedge fund advisers relied on the private fund adviser exemption to avoid registration under the Advisers Act. We classify all unregistered advisers matched with a hedge fund manager name as hedge fund managers becasue they were only allowed to manage private funds. The Dodd-Frank Act eliminated the private adviser exemption for all hedge fund advisers with regulatory assets of $150 million or more.
13 Since the ADV form does not provide information on the percentage of assets attributable to each type of client prior to 2011, we use instead the information on the percentage of clients of each type.
14 Prior to 1998, we cannot reliably identify hedge fund managers, because the databases used to identify hedge fund managers do not retain dead funds until 1998. Table 1 and Plot B of Table 1 displays the overlap between mutual fund and hedge fund holdings. Of the stocks that hedge funds hold, 99% are also held by mutual funds. Yet, only 76% of the stocks that mutual funds hold are also held by (seemingly less-diversified) hedge funds.
15 Turnover is the average dollar values of buys and sells over the quarter relative to the initial holdings [i.e. turnover=($buys q +$sells q )/(2×$holdings q−1 )]. Hedge funds turn over 39.2% of their portfolio over the quarter, whereas mutual funds turn over 19.7%. Plot C of Figure 1 presents the time-series of the average quarterly turnover.
Methodology

Measuring Style
Following GTW, we assess whether an advisor follows a momentum strategy from Lag 0 Momentum (L0M), the vector product of (active) portfolio weight changes (observed quarterly) and past returns (observed monthly):
where L0M iq is the L0M measure of fund i in quarter q, w i,j,q is fund i's quarter-q ending weight on stock j, 16 m identifies the month following the end of quarter q − 1, N (q) is the number of available stocks in quarter q, and R j,q,m is stock j's return in the m th month of quarter q. This measure is computed for each fund and each quarter. A positive L0M
indicates a tendency towards momentum investing-the fund is buying stocks with positive returns in the past quarter and/or selling stocks with negative returns in the past quarter.
Conversely, a negative L0M points to contrarian investing.
Each quarter, we average the L0M iq measures across all mutual (hedge) funds in the sample to evaluate their aggregate tendency (L0M q ) to follow momentum in quarter q. The average momentum investment measure (L0M) along with its sample t-statistic is obtained 16 To insure that the measure captures only "active" changes in weights, i.e. discretionary weight changes that are caused by changes in quantities rather than prices, we use the beginning-of-quarter price, p j,q−1 , when computing weight changes:
from the time-series of these aggregate tendencies:
where K(q) is the number of fund managers of a given type (hedge, mutual, or other) in quarter q and Q is the number of quarters in the sample.
We also compute a related L0M using a cross-sectional average in lieu of a time-series average. In this case, we first obtain an average L0M i measure for each fund i over the number of quarters, Q(i), for which it exists, and then average across the total number, K, of fund managers of a given type in the sample period:
Compared to the time-series average, the cross-sectional average gives relatively more weight to funds with shorter tenures and those operating in months with greater numbers of funds.
A fund's investment style may differ on the buy and sell sides or may be influenced more by one side than the other. To capture this difference, we measure an advisor's buy and sell momentum style, respectively L0Mb and L0Ms, from quarterly measures of the style as follows:
where
While the measure of momentum investing in equation (1) is zero under the null hypothesis of no momentum investing, the partial buy and sell measures based on raw returns are not.
Therefore, the partial buy and sell measures in equations (9)- (10) subtract a fund-specific benchmark return in each quarter. In the absence of this adjustment, the buy measure will have a positive bias because weight changes and returns tend to be positive-spuriously indicating momentum-whereas the sell measure will have a negative bias. Since the weight changes add to zero when summed across purchases and sales, subtracting that fund-specific benchmark for the overall measure has no effect on the overall measure. It is purely designed to ensure that the buy and sell versions of the measure estimate the covariance between weight changes and past returns.
The benchmark return in equation (11) is a proxy for the fund's expected return that month based on the size and book-to-market characteristics of the fund's beginning-ofquarter portfolio. For each stock j in that fund's portfolio, R SzBm j,q−1,m is the return of the value-weighted month-t return of stocks with similar size and book-to-market ratio. Specifically, each month, NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq stocks are sorted into value-weighted portfolios based on a sequential 5 × 5 sort on size and book-to-market, using NYSE breakpoints.
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The size and book-to-market portfolios to which the stock belongs are based on its past 17 Size is measured as of the end of the prior June and BM is as of the end of the prior fiscal year.
rankings on the two characteristics.
In addition to aggregating the L0M measure, we use quarterly Fama-MacBeth crosssectional regressions of fund-level measures, L0M iq on dummy variables indicating whether the fund is a mutual (MF) or hedge fund (HF):
Since these regressions are based on the entire cross-section of funds, the coefficients on the dummy variables measure the momentum behavior and performance of mutual and hedge funds relative to the "other" advisor category.
Measuring Performance
We evaluate fund performance as the vector product of the fund's (active) weight changes and future risk-adjusted returns. This performance measure, adapted from Grinblatt and Titman (1993) , employs the portfolio held by the fund at the end of the previous quarter as its benchmark,
where R * j,q,m is the risk-adjusted return for stock j in month m of quarter q. A measure greater than zero indicates that purchases outperform sales. Thus, the performance measure is much like the L0M style measure except that a) it uses next quarter's future returns rather than lagged returns and b) adjusts each of those returns for risk.
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Following DGTW, the stock-by-stock risk adjustment for F1M * matches each stock in a given month to a value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the same quintiles for both size and book-to-market ( * = size, bm) or for size, book-to-market, and momentum ( * = DGT W ).
18 We also examine how the fund's holdings changes perform over periods beyond the next three months.
The risk adjustment consists of subtracting the return of the matched portfolio from the return of the stock. The stock-level adjustment for size and book-to-market was described in the prior subsection. The stock-by-stock adjustments that includes momentum is similar and described in DGTW.
Even without a risk adjustment for the return of each stock held, the expected value of the F1M measure is zero under the null hypothesis of no investment skill, provided that, over the next quarter, the portfolio of stocks recently purchased by the manager tend to have the same priced risk as the stocks sold. We risk adjust returns because the priced risk of a stock may be dynamic and funds may dispose of stocks when their risk has declined in favor of stocks with higher priced risk. Hedge funds, for example, tend to hold smaller stocks with higher book-to-market ratios (see Table 1 Panel C). Such stocks tend to have positive market-adjusted returns due to the size and value effects, but the size and value attributes of a stock tend to change over time.
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Unlike L0M, there is no need for further adjustment to F1M* if we want to separately compute the performance contribution from purchases or sales of assets. Returns are already risk adjusted. However, in contrast to L0Mb and L0Ms, this adjustment takes place at the stock level rather than the fund level. To obtain the separate performance contributions of buys and sells, referred to as F1Mb * iq and F1Ms * iq , we simply sum the terms of equation (13) separately for weight changes that are positive and negative, respectively. We compute timeseries and cross-sectional averages of this performance measure with the same aggregation sequences used for L0M. As with L0M, we use quarterly Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of fund-level measures, F1M iq , on dummy variables indicating whether the fund is a mutual (MF) or hedge fund (HF).
19 A comparison with measures based on raw returns is provided in the Robustness section.
Results
We proceed to examine the investment styles of mutual and hedge fund advisors and the relation between these styles and fund performance.
Hedge Fund and Mutual Fund Styles
The results reported in Table 2 reveral that that hedge fund advisors are contrarians, in contrast to mutual fund advisors who are momentum investors. The latter finding is consistent with Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) . Panel A presents the time-series mean of the cross-sectional averages (as in equation (4)) of each quarter's L0M for advisors of a given type with t-statistics in parentheses (as in equation (5) However, the increased buying of losers outweighed the increased selling of these stocks, making hedge funds' overall strategy more contrarian during the two meltdown periods.
Mutual fund advisors' buy and sell L0M measures are typically both positive, indicating a persistent tendency to buy winners and sell losers.
Panel C of Table 2 shows the number of momentum and contrarian advisors by fund type. About two-thirds of hedge fund advisors are contrarian and two-thirds of mutual fund advisors are momentum traders. While more than two-thirds of the hedge fund advisors are contrarian in their buys, only about half are contrarian in their sells. In contrast, most mutual fund advisors follow momentum in both their buys and sells.
Panel D of Table 2 documents that most advisors demonstrate persistent investment (=100%−36%) of the momentum hedge funds from the first half also follow momentum in the second half. Similarly, 78% (=100%−22%) of the momentum mutual fund advisors from the first half also follow momentum in the second, and 71% of the contrarian mutual fund advisors from the first half are also contrarian in the second half.
We further examine the relation between fund type and investment strategy through Fama-MacBeth quarterly cross-sectional regressions of L0M on a constant and dummy variables indicating whether the advisor is a mutual or a hedge fund advisor (see equation (12)). Table 3 reports the time-series average of the estimated coefficients with their sample tstatistics. The results confirm that, relative to 'other' institutional advisors (the omitted dummy), mutual fund advisors tend to follow momentum strategies, while hedge fund advisors are contrarians. The positive intercept shows that 'other' institutional advisors are also momentum investors, but to a lesser extent than mutual fund advisors.
Performance of Mutual and Hedge funds
We now examine the F1M performance measure (equation (13)), which is based on the covariance between active weight changes and subsequent stock returns. Specifically, we compute two versions of the performance measure that control for changing risk premia in individual stocks by using risk-adjusted returns. The first, F1M
SzBm iq
, controls for size-and book-to-market and the second, F1M
DGT W iq
, controls for size, book-to-market, and momentum. These two versions of F1M are described below equation (13). Table 4 The comparison is even less favorable to mutual funds once we control for momentum:
the F1M DGT W measure shows that mutual funds generate an insignificant 2 bpq after adjusting performance for the return-enhancing effects of their momentum investment style.
In other words, mutual funds perform as well as a naïve momentum investor. Mutual funds' buy and sell performance measures also are insignificant, irrespective of controls, and quite negligible in magnitude (below 4 basis points per quarter) once we control for momentum.
By contrast, controlling for the contrarian style has little effect on hedge fund performance:
their F1M DGT W measure of 25 bpq (t-statistic of 3.72) negligibly differs from the 27 bpq performance metric that lacks the past return control.
The superior performance of hedge funds in Panel A derives entirely from stock purchases, which earn 28 bpq (SizeBM-adjsuted) and 26 bpq (DGTW-adjusted), respectively, both significant at the 1% level. Since the performance measures are based on characteristicsadjusted returns, hedge fund performance derives from their advisors' stock-picking ability rather than from following a strategy based on the size, value, or momentum anomalies.
While hedge funds' buys are contrarian, their advisors earn alpha by picking picking the 'right' losers, in that these stocks outperform other past losers with similar size and bookto-market attributes. hedge funds derive a small portion of their performance from selling stocks in their portfolio that will soon earn inferior returns. Generally, the mutual fund alphas in Table 4 (12), but with a different dependent variable), confirm that hedge fund advisors have superior stock-picking ability. The insignificant intercept indicates that the performance of "other" institutional advisors is close to zero.
Mutual fund advisors significantly outperform these other advisors by 10.6 bpq based on the F1M SzBm measure, of which 7.6 comes from their purchases. However, all of this alpha is due to the tendency of mutual funds to follow momentum strategies; once we control for momentum the performance difference drops to a negligible 1.1 bpq. By contrast, hedge fund managers significantly outperform "other" institutional managers by 24.4 bpq based on F1M SzBm and 24.9 bpq based on F1M DGT W . Virtually all of this performance can be attributed to hedge fund purchases. Moreover, the last column of Table 5 , which reports the difference in the two slope coefficients, reveals a significant performance difference between mutual and hedge funds. The performance gap is driven by the purchases and is larger after accounting for mutual funds' momentum style. Using the F1M DGT W measure, hedge fund buys outperform mutual fund buys by 22.5 bpq.
Performance and Investment Style
To assess whether investment style influences performance, Table 6 Tables   2 and 4 for the entire sample. The sorts in Table 6 reveal a striking difference berween the performance of contrarian and momentum hedge funds. Only contrarian hedge funds (the 867 funds with L0M i < 0 in Table 2 zero. Thus, the significant hedge fund performance observed in Table 4 is entirely driven by contrarian hedge fund advisors. The latter group has the ability to pick superior stocks to buy, and, based on the cross-sectional results in Panel B, also apprears to have some tallent for selling the stocks they own.
Regardless of style, the results in Table 6 show no evidence of investment skills among mutual fund managers besides the effect of momentum on stock returns, which explains the alpha of the momentum group in Panel A.
Evidence from Stock Returns
Up to this point, we have examined performance of momentum and contrarian investors at the fund level. An alternative approach is to analyze abnormal returns of stocks that are favored or disfavored by momentum and contrarian fund advisors . This approach allows us to examine the profitability of trades by different types of advisers as well as the interactions between advisers of different types.
We construct the buy (sell) portfolios for different types of advisers as follows: First, we classify advisors into groups based on their fund-type (mutual or hedge fund) and style (momentum or contrarian, according to their average L0M
SzBm i
over the sample period). We then compute the monthly, DGTW-adjusted equally-weighted portfolio returns of stocks for which the aggregate shareholdings of a given group of advisors increased (decreased) over the previous quarter. We also examine stock portfolios for which a pairing of two advisor groups saw one group increase (decrease) its shareholdings and the other group decrease (increase) its shareholdings. show that a) the alphas of stocks bought by hedge fund advisors exceed those of the stocks they sell by 27 basis points per month (bpm), b) most of the 27 basis point difference stems from the buys of stocks that beat their DGTW benchmarks, and c) nearly all of this alpha difference is due to the trades of contrarian hedge fund advisors. By contrast, the stocks sold by the mutual fund advisor group tend to be good performers in the subsequent quarter, earning almost 20 basis points per month more than their DGTW benchmark. Figure 4 shows that these findings are persistent. It graphs 36-month moving averages of the DGTW-adjusted returns for each of the four buy minus sell portfolios in Table 7 Panel For example, stocks that contrarian hedge funds buy and momentum mutual funds sell exhibit the highest portfolio alphas (28.2 bpm), while the lowest alphas (−11.9 bpm) belong to stocks that contrarian hedge funds sell and contrarian mutual funds buy. Besides the latter case, contrarian hedge fund sells do not significantly underperform in the subsequent period. Contrarian hedge fund buys are generally more successful: They have a significantly positive alpha unless momentum mutual funds also buy the stock. Irrespective of style, mutual funds trades generally do not earn abnormal returns: the stocks that mutual funds buy (the first and third column) lack a significant positive alpha (except when contrarian hedge funds are also buying), and the stocks that they sell (the second and fourth columns) lack a significant negative alpha. Overall, these findings show that hedge funds benefit from mutual fund sells, in particular if the hedge funds are contrarian.
Robustness tests
Our results are robust to alternative weight calculations, alternative formation and holding periods, alternative return adjustments, and alternative estimation methods.
Alternative weights
The weight of a stock may change from quarter q − 1 to q not only because the fund changes the number of shares it owns but also because the size of the equity portfolio changes.
For example, if the fund buys (sells) new stocks due to capital inflows (outflows), the weights of the existing stocks will decrease (increase) even if the number of shares held of these stocks remains unchanged. While the changes in weights resulting from trading other stocks may be regarded as discretionary because they indicate a choice not to rebalance existing portfolio holdings, they do not represent actual 'buy' and 'sell' decisions.
To address this concern, we compute 'real' buy ('real' sell) L0M and F1M measures as partial sums only over the stocks for which there is an increase (decrease) in both portfolio weight and number of shares held:
shares j,q >shares j,q−1
L0Mrs iq = 3 m=1 w j,q <w j,q−1 shares j,q <shares j,q−1 (w j,q − w j,q−1 )R j,q−1+m (15)
F1Mrs iq = 3 m=1 w j,q <w j,q−1 shares j,q <shares j,q−1
F1Mr iq = F1Mrb iq + F1Mrs iq
As before, SzBm-and DGTW-adjusted returns are used when computing the 'real' momentum and performance measures.
Panel A of Table 8 presents the time-series average of the cross-sectional mean of these momentum and performance measures. The measures based on 'real' buys and sells are virtually identical to the baseline case in Panels A of Tables 2 and 4, indicating that in practice, the unadjusted weights are driven by 'real' buy and sell decisions.
Alternative formation period
The baseline L0M momentum measure relates current quarter weights changes to current quarter returns and thus examines whether funds' trades are influenced by most recent returns. Since fund holdings are observed at quarter-ends while the actual trading is done throughout the entire quarter, trades may sometimes take place before the returns in the L0M measure are observed. As GTW (1995, p. 1091) argue, this would not bias the momentum measure, except in the unlikely case when portfolio revisions occur predominantly at the beginning of the quarter and are informative about subsequent returns. In that case, the hedge fund L0M measure would be biased upwards-weighing against our finding that hedge funds are contrarian investors.
To study the robustness of the L0M measure and assess whether funds' trades are also influenced by more distant returns, we compute an L1M measure (Lag 1 Momentum), which relates current quarter weight changes to past quarter returns:
This measure is the same as GTW's L1M measure, except for an adjustment to the weights:
The weights w * in eq.(19) differ from the weights w in eq. (2) in that we use the price at the end of quarter q − 2 instead of the price at the end of quarter q − 1, to ensure that they are unaffected by subsequent returns.
Panel B of Table 8 is also smaller that the L0M measure of −0.34, but remains highly significant, indicating that hedge funds' contrarian trades are influenced by both most recent and more distant returns.
Alternative holding period
The stocks that the fund buys (sells) may outperform (underperform) similar stocks, but not necessarily in the immediate 3 months following rebalancing, as represented by the F1M measure (equation (13)) reported in Table 4 . To examine how these stocks perform over the remainder of the year, we also compute a performance measure, F1M 4−12 , which is based on returns over months m = 4, ..., 12 after portfolio rebalancing:
Panel C of Table 8 shows that, similar to the first three months (see Table 4 ), mutual fund portfolio rebalancing does not produce superior returns for the remainder of the subsequent year. In contrast, hedge fund buys continue to outperform although most profits come during the first quarter. For example, based on DGTW-adjusted returns, hedge fund buys generate an alpha of 26 basis points over the immediate quarter following the trade (Table 4 Panel A), followed by an additional 14 basis points over the subsequent three quarters (Table 8 Panel C).
Alternative return adjustments
Our main performance measures include two types of risk-adjustment: 1) self-benchmarkingusing the returns the fund would have realized if it did not rebalance its holdings between quarters q − 1 and q, and 2) characteristics-benchmarking-using the returns of stocks with similar characteristics as a benchmark, thus comparing the fund's returns with the returns on a 'naïve' style-based investment strategy. Characteristics-benchmarking allows us to interpret the performance measures as true alpha derived from the manager's stock-picking skills, as well as to examine the performance of buys and sells separately.
For robustness, Panel D of Table 8 This similarity indicates that the stocks bought by mutual and hedge funds have similar characteristics to the stocks sold by the same type of funds.
Alternative estimation method
To further test whether the intensity of momentum or contrarian behavior is rewarded, we study coefficients from Fama-McBeth regressions of a fund's quarter q + 1 performance (both overall and for its buys and sells) on its quarter q L0M style measure (or the comparable L0M measure for its buys and sells). The results (unreported) are consistent with those reported in Table 6 . These regressions, run separately for mutual and hedge funds, show a significant positive relation between the L0M style measure and subsequent returns for mutual funds, but only if the returns do not control for stock momentum. The intercepts from the regression are insignificant, confirming that mutual fund managers' returns are an artifact of their momentum investing. By contrast, hedge funds' significant intercepts and insignificant slope coefficients-regardless of the benchmark-confirm that their performance is due to superior stock-picking skills, and not driven by their investment style.
Conclusion
Prior literature documents that mutual fund managers tend to follow momentum strategies, and their style accounts for any abnormal returns they generate. This paper examines whether the same momentum strategy is widely deployed by hedge fund managers, and whether the investment style affects performance. Using a database constructed from mandatory reporting of advisors' holdings of stocks, we find that the style and performance of hedge fund managers are remarkably different from those of mutual funds.
In contrast to mutual funds, most hedge funds are contrarian, largely due to a a strong tendency to buy recent losers. The losing stocks acquired by hedge funds do well, earning significant alphas over the subsequent quarter. Moreover, despite the headwinds from lower expected returns faced by simple contrarian strategies, contrarian hedge fund managers exhibit superior performance, outperforming both momentum hedge funds and risk-adjusted benchmarks. This finding is not influenced by survivorship bias (the database does not suffer from it), transaction costs (our performance measures take into account stock characteristics), or any other expenses associated with a fund (our performance measures are based solely on the underlying portfolio). Thus, we conclude that the superior performance of contrarian hedge funds is due to their managers' ability to identify underpriced stocks among losers that other invetors avoid.
In addition to fund-level analysis, our findings are confirmed by a analysis in the crosssection of stocks. In particular, we sort stocks into categories based on aggregate net buys or sells of various categories of fund advisors, namely whether the advisor is a hedge fund or mutual fund manager. We find that the highest alpha stocks are sold to contrarian hedge funds by momentum mutual funds. Thus, contrarian hedge funds profit to a great extent from fleecing mutual funds out of their undervalued stocks. Uninformed momentum mutual funds that blindly sell losing stocks face an adverses selection problem when selling to hedge funds that can distinguish undervalued from overvalued stocks. Why mutual funds do this is not readily apparent, but portfolio liquidity requirements and the need to cater to retail investors, suggested by Massa, Simonov, and Yan (2012) , offer promising avenues for future research.
Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and their relationship to hedge funds provides another interesting research arena. Unlike mutual funds, ETFs have the benefit of price adjustment to cushion the redemptions of retail investors. However, unlike mutual funds, ETFs tend to be passive holders of stocks. Because they have less discretion in the stock they sell in the face of shareholder redemptions, they may be more subject to adverse selection than mutual funds. The extent to which contrarian hedge funds profit from ETFs remains an open question.
Finally, it might be instructive to understand why hedge fund buys account for virtually all of their superior performance of contrarian hedge funds. On the one hand, this finding is consistent with theories of private information acquisition-it is easier to come across a gem of a trade when scanning a broad universe of stocks. There are too few stocks in a hedge fund portfolio to identify one that is greatly overvalued. While the universe of stocks offers plenty of gems to short, the chance that the same stock will be in the hedge fund portfolio are relatively slim. Hedge funds, of course, often short stocks, despite short sale constraints, but are not required to report their equity short positions. If future reporting requirements include short positions, the asymmetry in the abnormal performance of purchases and sales of hedge funds could disappear-and be regarded as an artifact of data limitations. 
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The SzBm (DGTW) label indicates that the measure uses returns adjusted for size and book-to-market (and momentum). The table presents the time-series average of the estimated coefficients with their sample t-statistics in parentheses (bold if significant at the 5% level). The last column provides a test for the difference between the estimated coefficients for hedge funds and mutual funds. The sample period is from January 1998 to December 2012. 
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for contrarian and momentum traders for both mutual and hedge funds. The SzBm (DGTW) label indicates that the measure uses returns adjusted for size and book-to-market (and momentum). Momentum (contrarian) funds are those with a positive (negative) average performance measure L0M i over the entire life of the funds. There are 396 (193) momentum (contrarian) mutual funds and 475 (867) momentum (contrarian) hedge funds, respectively. Cross-sectional t-statistics are presented in parentheses (bold if significant at the 5% level). The t-test for the difference in means between contrarian and momentum funds assumes unequal variances accross groups and unequal sample sizes. (14)- (17) as partial sums over weight changes that are accompanied by changes in the number of shares held in the same direction as the weight change. Panel B presents the momentum measure L1M which is based on an alternative formation period as per eq. (18), along with the L0M momentum measure. Panel C presents the performance measure F1M
4−12
i,q , which is based on holding period returns over months 4 to 12 following portfolio rebalancing as per eq.(20). Time-series t-statistics are provided in parentheses underneath each coefficient (bold if significant at the 5% level). The t-statistics for the F1M 4−12 measures in Panel C are Newey-West adjusted with 2 lags due to the overlapping quarterly returns. The percent of positive quarterly measures are provided in brackets. Panel D compares momentum and performance measures calculated using alternative measures of returns, where 'Raw' indicates raw returns and 'Excess' indicates that each stock month-t return is demeaned by the month-t CRSP value-weighted market return. Figure 4 . Time-series of DGTW-adjusted monthly portfolio returns.
In each quarter, we sort stocks into buy and sell portfolios depending on whether a particular type of funds increased or decreased their aggregate holdings of the stock over the previous quarter. For each type of funds, we take the difference between the equally weighted DGTW-adjusted monthly returns on their buys and sells. Plots A and B present the 36-month moving average of DGTW-adjusted buy-sell returns for portfolios based on the trades of contrarian and momentum funds, respectively. 
